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can never be justified,70 the supreme court may have undervalued the
need for a psychiatric examination that can arise in special circum-
stances, overreacted to the burden such an exam imposes on certain
witnesses, and denied North Carolina trial courts a potentially effective
evidentiary tool for assessing witness credibility.
7 1
KURT D. WINTERKORN
Federal Jurisdiction-Civil Rights-Monell v. Department of
Social Services: The Court Compromises on Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act' provides a federal2 cause of
action for any person whose constitutional rights have been violated
"under color of state law." Since the Supreme Court's expansive defi-
nition of "under color of state law" in Monroe v. Pape3 in 1961, the
70. For a discussion of the role of the expert psychiatric witness in the interaction of law and
modem science and an earlier reluctance of the North Carolina courts to increase reliance on
psychiatric opinion, see A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1943, 21 N.C.L. REV.
323, 348 (1943).
71. Justice Exum, in his concurring opinion, concluded, "Situations calling for the entry of
such an order would, it seems, be rare indeed. But if called for, our judges should have the power
to enter the order." 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (concurring opinion).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims is conferred upon the federal courts by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1970), which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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statute has been the principal tool used by the federal judiciary to pro-
tect citizens' constitutional rights from state encroachment and to pro-
vide compensation for persons injured by constitutional violations.4
The utility of section 1983 was, however, long impaired by the holding
in Monroe that municipalities and other local governmental entities
were not "persons" for section 1983 purposes and hence could not be
sued pursuant to the statute.' In Monell v. Department of Social
Services6 the Court overruled Monroe, holding that municipalities can
be sued under section 1983 when a municipal policy, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom inflicts constitutional injury.' The Court did, however,
place a significant limitation on the scope of municipal liability under
section 1983 by holding that local governments cannot be held liable on
a respondeat superior theory for the section 1983 violations of their em-
ployees.8 In addition, the Court intimated that a further limitation on
municipal liability-in the form of a qualified immunity for muncipal
defendants in section 1983 actions-may be developed in the near
future.9
Monell was initiated by several employees of the Department of
Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York
who brought a class action under section 1983 challenging, on due
process grounds, the constitutionality of a mandatory pregnancy leave
policy allegedly adopted by the Board and the Department.'° Plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as back pay for the
period of forced leave." As defendants, the complaint named the De-
partment and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the
City of New York and its Mayor. 2 The individual defendants were
4. For an extensive survey of§ 1983 law, with particular emphasis on the statute's impact on
state-fcderal relations, see Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1133 (1977).
5. 365 U.S. at 187.
6. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. Id. at 690.
8. Id. at 694.
9. Id. at 701.
10. Id. at 661. According to the employees' allegations, this policy arbitrarily required them
to take unpaid leaves of absence at a certain stage of their pregnancies, regardless of their physical
capability to work beyond that stage. Id.
11. Id. Plaintiffs were required to quit work approximately one month before it would have
become medically necessary for them to do so. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. 436 U.S. at 661.
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sued solely in their "official capacity," meaning that any monetary re-
covery from them was to be paid out of municipal funds.'
3
While the Monell case was pending in federal district court,'4 the
Supreme Court, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur,'5 struck
down, on due process grounds, a mandatory pregnancy leave policy
similar to that involved in Monell. The district court recognized that
under Lafleur the New York City policy in Monell was unconstitu-
tional, 6 but dismissed the action nonetheless, holding that any attempt
to secure back pay from the City under section 1983, either by suing the
Board, the Department, or the City directly, or by suing the individual
defendants in their official capacity, was barred by the doctrine of mu-
nicipal immunity announced in Monroe v. Pape.7 The district court's
judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit on similar grounds.' 8
The Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision based entirely on
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, reversed the judgments of
the lower courts, holding that municipalities and other local govern-
mental entities may, in some circumstances, be held liable under sec-
tion 1983. In so doing, the Court rejected the interpretation of the
legislative history of section 1983 that had formed the sole basis of the
Monroe Court's holding that local governments were immune from lia-
bility under the statute."
Section 1983 originated as section one of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,20 sometimes known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.2' During consid-
eration of the Act, the House rejected an amendment, offered by Sena-
tor Sherman, that would have imposed liability on towns and counties
13. For a discussion of official capacity suits, see notes 38-40 and 47-48 and accompanying
text infra.
14. 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
15. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
16. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
17. Id. The court held plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because
both the Board and the Department had abolished their mandatory pregnancy leave policies. Id.
18. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. The Monroe Court expressly refused to consider policy reasons for or against municipal
immunity. 365 U.S. at 191.
20. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
21. The general purpose of the Act was to suppress violence in the post-Civil War South,
where gangs of Klan members were allegedly terrorizing blacks and white Republicans. For a
vivid description of the situation the Act was intended to remedy, see the remarks of Senator
Sherman, CONG. GLOaE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 154-58 (1871).
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for damage done to their inhabitants "by persons riotously and tumul-
tuously assembled."22 The Monroe Court interpreted the House rejec-
tion of the Sherman Amendment as an indication of Congress' intent
that municipalities not be held liable under any portion of the Act, in-
cluding section 1983.23 In Monell, the Court concluded, after a thor-
ough reexamination of the legislative history of the Act, that Monroe
had erred in its interpretation of legislative intent and that the 1871
Congress, despite its rejection of the Sherman Amendment, had in-
tended that muncipalities be included as "persons" within section
1983.24
The key to the Court's opinion in Monell is the distinction drawn
between municipal liability under the Sherman Amendment and that
imposed by section 1983. The Sherman Amendment was a rather dras-
tic piece of "riot act" legislation. It provided that towns and counties
would be liable for all damage done to person or property byprivate
persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled," even if the govern-
ment had no prior knowledge of the impending riot.25 According to
the Court, section one of the Act (now section 1983), on the other hand,
imposed liability only for the municipality's own constitutional
violations.
Therefore the Court did not find in the debates on the Sherman
Amendment a complete bar to municipal liability under section 1983.26
22. Id. at 800. The full text of the Sherman Amendment is included in the appendix to the
majority opinion in MAonell. 436 U.S. at 702.
23. 365 U.S. at 191. According to the Monroe Court's interpretation, the 1871 Congress con-
sidered itself constitutionally powerless to impose § 1983 liability on towns and counties, because
local governments were instrumentalities of state, not federal, law. Id. at 190.
24. 436 U.S. at 690.
25. According to its sponsor, the purpose of the Sherman Amendment was to compensate for
the state courts' inability to cope with the Klan problem. Senator Sherman noted that, despite the
prevalence of Klan violence, indictments of Klan members were rare. And even when an indict-
ment was handed down, a jury of sympathetic peers would usually render a verdict of not guilty.
Sherman felt that his amendment, by holding the town or county liable for Klan violence, would
encourage the local citizenry to take action to suppress the Klan. Sherman claimed that a similar
law had been enacted in England to quell the widespread social disorder following the Norman
Conquest, and that several states had enacted statutes to the same effect. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 760, 761 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
26. The most prominent objection to the Sherman Amendment was that it would impose on
towns and counties an obligation to protect their citizens and their property from rioters. In effect,
the Sherman Amendment would have required local government entities to establish police forces
to keep the peace. Several congressmen believed that since a local government was an instrumen-
tality of state law, the federal government had no constitutional power to impose such an obliga-
tion on towns and counties. See, e.g., id. at 788-89 (remarks of Rep. Kerr). Justice Brennan,
reasoning from established case law existing at the time of the 1871 debates, concluded that the
Congressmen would not have perceived a similar constitutional problem in simply requiring local
governments to abide by the Constitution in their own actions. 436 U.S. at 679-82. Furthermore,
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They did find, however, in the rejection of the Sherman Amendment, a
significant limitation on that liability. On the basis of the plain lan-
guage of the statute and "Congress' rejection of the only form of vicari-
ous liability presented to it," 7 the Court concluded that the 1871
Congress did not intend municipalities to be vicariously liable under
traditional principles of tort law for the section 1983 violations of their
employees. 8 Instead, the Court held that a municipality can be named
as a defendant in a section 1983 action only when some municipal pol-
icy, ordinance, regulation, or custom inflicts a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. 9
The Court's opinion in Monell concluded with a cursory discus-
sion of the possibility that a limited form of immunity may be con-
ferred upon municipal defendants in section 1983 actions.3 Though
the Court chose to "express no views on the scope of municipal immu-
nity beyond holding that municipal bodies . . . cannot be entitled to an
absolute immunity,"'" the possibility of a qual/fed immunity for local
governments-similar to that granted to governmental officials in sec-
tion 1983 actions-was implicitly left open.
Though Monroe v. Pape greatly expanded the scope of section
198332 by interpreting "under color of state law" to include the misuse
of power by state officials,33 the Monroe Court also placed a major re-
striction on the utility of section 1983 with its holding that municipali-
ties were not "persons" for section 1983 purposes and hence could not
Brennan pointed to certain passages in the debates that showed "unequivocally" that Congress
intended municipalities to be held liable under § 1983. Id. at 683-90.
27. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57.
28. Id. at 694. Mr. Justice Stevens did not join this portion of the Court's opinion, because it
was "merely advisory" and not necessary to resolve the issues presented by Monell. Id. at 714
(concurring opinion).
29. Id. at 690.
30. Id. at 701.
31. Id.
32. Prior to Monroe, § 1983 had been interpreted narrowly by the courts and, as a result, only
a handful of § 1983 actions were successfully maintained. For a brief analysis of the statute's slow
beginnings, see Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 4, at 1156-61.
The Monroe decision paved the way for a phenomenal increase in the use of § 1983. Though
there are apparently no statistics on the exact number of § 1983 actions brought each year, one
authority estimates that while approximately 300 § 1983 claims were filed in 1960, over 12,000
such claims were filed in 1977. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals To Strengthen the
Section 1983 Damage Remedy For Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (1978).
33. In Monroe, plaintiffs sought monetary relief under § 1983 for injuries allegedly inflicted
by Chicago police officers. Plaintiffs alleged that the officers broke into their home without a
warrant, ransacked the house, and took one of the plaintiffs to a police station where he was
interrogated for 10 hours without being placed under arrest or taken before a magistrate. 365 U.S.
at 169. The defendants argued that § 1983 was inapplicable to these facts because the officers were
1979]
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be sued pursuant to the statute. An attempt in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno34 to limit Monroe to its facts, by arguing that the immunity ap-
plied only to actions for damages and not to suits for equitable relief,
was unsuccessful. Monroe and Kenosha combined to produce a doc-
trine of absolute municipal immunity from any action, legal or equita-
ble, brought under section 1983.35
From its inception, the municipal immunity doctrine was unpopu-
lar both with commentators, who criticized it frequently,36 and with the
lower federal courts, which devised several means to circumvent
Monroe. The Supreme Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence
37
provided one method of awarding injunctive relief against a municipal-
ity despite the Monroe immunity doctrine.38 This was accomplished
through the familiar fiction of "official capacity" suits. The plaintiff,
seeking an injunction against some unconstitutional municipal action,
would simply bring suit against the responsible individual governmen-
tal employee in his official capacity. By ordering the "official capacity"
defendant to cease enforcement of the unconstitutional municipal prac-
tice, the court would reach a result tantamount to an injunction against
the municipality itself. All the courts of appeals agreed that "official
capacity" suits for equitable relief were cognizable under section 1983,
despite their similarity to actions directly against the governmental en-
tity.39 The Supreme Court itself gave implicit recognition to the "offi-
cial capacity" method of circumventing Monroe while ostensibly
adhering to the municipal immunity doctrine.4 0  Thus, well before
Monell, injunctive relief under section 1983 could be awarded against a
municipality, albeit indirectly.
acting contrary to state law, not pursuant to it, and hence the "under color of state law" require-
nient was not satisfied. Id. at 172. The Court rejected this argument, holding that "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law, is taken 'under color of' state law.'" Id. at 184 (quoting Justice
Stone in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
34. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
35. The municipal immunity doctrine has been the subject of extensive commentary. For an
exceptionally thorough and well-documented analysis, see Levin, The Section 1983 Municopal Im-
munity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1977).
36. Eg., Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 134-35 (1972); Comment, Developing GovernmentalLiabili , Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
38. See generally Levin, supra note 35, at 1496-504.
39. See id. at 1501 n.67.
40. In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976), a munic-
ipal workers union named the City of Charlotte, the City Council, and the individual council
members in their official capacity as defendants in a suit to obtain an injunction ordering that
union dues be withheld from members' paychecks. The Court held that the municipal immunity
[Vol. 57
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The lower courts continued their efforts to circumvent the munici-
pal immunity doctrine by devising monetary damage remedies for per-
sons injured by unconstitutional municipal action. Much of this
activity centered around the judicial creation of a cause of action
against local governmental entities similar to that created by the Court
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.4" In Bivens, the Court held that a cause of action could be
implied from the fourth amendment, giving a person whose fourth
amendment rights are violated by a federal officer a monetary damage
remedy against the offending officer.42 By analogy to Bivens, commen-
tators argued that a similar cause of action against local governmental
entities could be implied from the fourteenth amendment.43  By pro-
ceeding under a Bivens-type cause of action, rather than section 1983, a
person injured by municipal constitutional violations could evade the
restrictions imposed by the section 1983 municipal immunity doctrine
and thereby obtain compensation from the municipality in the form of
money damages. By the time Monell was decided, four federal courts
of appeals had accepted the Bivens analogy and found a cause of action
against local governmental entities implied under the fourteenth
amendment.' Three others intimated that such an action might be
maintained,45 while one refused to find an implied cause of action.
46
doctrine barred suit against the City or the Council but that the suit could nonetheless be main-
tained against the individual council members in their official capacity. Id. at 284 n.L. In consid-
ering this decision, one commentator noted that "the Court did not pause to explain what
conceivable interests could be furthered by such a ruling." Levin, supra note 35, at 1502.
41. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
42. Id. at 397.
43. Eg., Hundt, Suing Mun'cipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 770 (1975); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municflalitiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89
HARV. L. REv. 923 (1976). The movement toward the creation of a Bivens-type cause of action
against municipalities was fueled by language in the majority and concurring opinions in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 514, 516, that seemed to indicate that the Court would find no
obstacle to such a development.
44. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 1978) (decided one day before Monell; hold-
ing that plaintiff, victim of officially condoned police harassment, could maintain action against
city); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 1977) (public official's job termi-
nated without due process), vacatedfor reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978);
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975) (employee
dismissed without due process); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975) (citizen's
fourth amendment rights violated by city building inspectors).
45. Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stan-
ton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d
803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975).
46. Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37,43 (lst Cir. 1977). Finding a Bivens-type cause of action on
the facts of Kosika would have required the court to impose vicarious liability on municipalities
for the constitutional violations of their employees. The court indicated that they may have found
1979]
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Another method of circumventing Monroe in order to award dam-
ages to persons injured by unconstitutional municipal action was
adopted by two courts of appeals. These courts extended the "official
capacity" method of recovery to actions for money damages by order-
ing "official capacity" defendants to obtain compensatory payments
from the funds of the governmental entity that would have been im-
mune had it been sued directly.47 These decisions were cited promi-
nently in petitioners' brief in Monell, providing a basis for the core of
their argument that the individual defendants, sued in their official ca-
pacity, could be ordered to obtain funds from the municipal treasury in
order to compensate the employees for the period of illegal forced
leave.48
The willingness of some courts to extend the "official capacity"
method of recovery to actions for monetary damages, like the creation
of a Bivens-type cause of action against municipalities, was illustrative
of the lower courts' desire to fashion some means of compensation for
constitutional injury inflicted by local governments, and of their con-
tinued dissatisfaction with the municipal immunity doctrine. By ap-
proaching the matter straightforwardly and overruling Monroe
outright, the Court has done much to clarify an area of the law that had
become seriously confused as a result of the lower courts' attempts to
circumvent the municipal immunity doctrine. Some aspects of the
Court's opinion suggest, however, that this area will still be a contro-
versial one. The Court's refusal to impose respondeat superior liability
on local governments for the constitutional torts of their agents, 49 and
the suggestion that local governments may eventually be accorded a
qualified immunity from section 1983 liability,5" suggest that section
a Bivens-type cause of action had the municipality been directly responsible for the alleged consti-
tutional violation. Id. at 45. The argument that the fourteenth amendment created a Bivens-type
cause of action against local governments was before the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), but the Court refused to decide the issue because it had
been raised only at oral argument and had not been fully briefed. Id. at 278.
47. Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975) (award of back pay from public
funds); Incarcerated Men v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (attorneys' fees).
48. Brief for Petitioners at 32-69. The court of appeals decision in Monell rejected this argu-
ment, drawing a distinction between "official capacity" suits for equitable relief and those for
money damages by analogy to a similar distinction in Supreme Court eleventh amendment cases.
532 F.2d 259, 265-67 (2d Cir. 1976). This analogy, however, was tenuous; the Court had, in an
earlier case, explicitly stated that the language of § 1983 did not permit any distinction based on
"the nature of relief sought." City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 513. The Kenosha language
effectively precluded the Court from adopting the court of appeals rationale in Monell, as Mr.
Justice Powell recognized in his concurrence. 436 U.S. at 712 (concurring opinion).
49. 436 U.S. at 694.
50. Id. at 701.
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1983 will remain a hollow remedy for many persons injured by uncon-
stitutional municipal action.
The respondeat superior limitation is especially significant, and
strong policy reasons argue against it. Under the Monell standard of
municipal liability, a local government will be subject to section 1983
liability only when it is direcdy responsible for a constitutional vila-
tion, such as when some officially adopted policy or ordinance inflicts
constitutional injury. A local government will not, under Monell, be
liable for its employees' ultra vires constitutional torts, that is, those
committed without governmental authority. In practical terms this
means that victims of unreasonable searches and seizures, police bru-
tality, and other forms of police misconduct will still be unable to seek
compensation for their injuries by bringing a section 1983 action
against the employing governmental entity. The only avenue of relief
for these persons is an action against the offending officer, which has
long been criticized as being ineffective from both a compensatory and
deterrence standpoint.51
When a citizen sues a police officer alleging some form of police
misconduct, several factors combine to make a jury verdict for the
plaintiff unlikely. The officer is protected by a qualified immunity, 2
which insulates him from liability in all but the most egregious of situa-
tions.53 Also, the jury is naturally reluctant to levy a damage judgment
against the policeman, whose job is difficult, dangerous, and not very
lucrative.54 Even in those situations in which a judgment against the
officer is obtained, the plaintiffs prospects of compensation are subject
to the possibility that the officer may be judgment-proof.5 5 Commenta-
tors have argued that the compensatory purpose of section 1983 would
51. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 26.03 (1976); Kates
& Kouba, supra note 36, at 136-42; Newman, supra note 32, at 447-67; Comment, supra 'note 36, at
1209.
52. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
53. The immunity protects the officer from liability for action taken in good faith and with
reasonable grounds to believe in the constitutionality of the action. In practice, this qualified
immunity often has the effect of an absolute one. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
54. The Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Federal District Judge for the District of Connecticut, writes
from his own experience: "A jury understandably succumbs easily to the argument, stated or
implied, that recovery should be denied because the damages must come from the paycheck of a
hard-working, underpaid police officer." Newman, supra note 32, at 456.
55. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 136-37; Comment, supra note 36, at 1209.
Professor Davis has summed up the situation with this description of a fictional conversation
between an attorney and a client who has been injured by police misconduct:
What the lawyer says to the bruised and battered client is something like this: "I believe
you when you say the policeman beat you up. A suit against him will cost several thou-
sand dollars, and we have about one chance in ten to get a judgment. If we get it, the
1979]
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be much better served by an action directly against the governmental
entity, on a respondeat superior theory.56 Such an action would also
serve as a more effective deterrent to police misconduct than the action
against the individual officer, because high government officials would
be influenced to supervise their employees more closely, and to disci-
pline officers who violate citizens' constitutional rights. 7
The Monell Court did not consider any of these policy arguments
in reaching its decision not to impose respondeat superior liability on
municipalities. Instead that decision was based solely on prior case law
interpretation of the statutory language of section 1983, combined with
Congress' rejection in 1871 of the Sherman Amendment.58 In Rizzo v.
Goode,59 the Court interpreted the language of section 1983 to preclude
the imposition of respondeat superior liability on a section 1983 defend-
ant, holding that liability could result only when the defendant had
acted affirmatively to "cause" the constitutional violation.60 Defendant
in Rizzo, however, was an individual supervisory official who, under a
respondeat superior theory, would be held personally liable for any
constitutional injury inflicted by subordinates. Arguably, the case for
vicarious liability is stronger when the defendant is a governmental en-
tity which, unlike the individual official, is capable of absorbing the
cost of employees' liability and spreading it across the entire
amount may be several hundred dollars. And we have no assurance of collecting it. Do
you want me to file an action?"
K. DAVIS, supra note 51, at 595.
56. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 51; Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 136-44; Newman, supra
note 32, at 455-58. This argument was adopted by some lower federal courts that found respondeat
superior liability under a Bivens-type cause of action. E.g., Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435
F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155
(N.D. I11. 1975). In Santiago, the court noted that the action against the individual officer rarely
results in compensation for the injured citizen and added: "[Tihe employer, rather than the in-
jured party, is in a better position to absorb the costs, insure against them and distribute the cost to
society." 435 F. Supp. at 148.
57. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 51, at 597; Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 140; Comment,
supra note 36, at 1209. It has been argued that a direct action against the municipality may have
the opposite effect. Because, under a respondeat superior standard, the officer would not be per-
sonally liable for unconstitutional misconduct, it is contended that the officer would no longer
have any incentive to refrain from such action. Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 393 n.1 I (E.D.
Pa. 1977). This seems highly implausible. First, the present inefficacy of the remedy against the
officer throws great doubt on its deterrent effect. Second, though an officer would not be person-
ally liable under a respondeat superior standard, he would be subject to disciplinary action by
superiors. The threat of losing one's job would probably be a more effective deterrent than the
threat of a lawsuit which, as experience has shown, rarely results in an adverse judgment.
58. 436 U.S. at 691-95.
59. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
60. Id. at 371. The facts of Rizzo are discussed in note 71 infra.
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community.6'
The Court's legislative history argument is also vulnerable because
of the difference between the nature of liability imposed on municipali-
ties by the Sherman Amendment and that imposed by a respondeat
superior theory of municipal liability. The Sherman Amendment
would have held towns and counties liable for damage done by private
citizens "riotously and tumultuously assembled." In contrast, a respon-
deat superior standard would impose liability only when the municipal-
ity's own agents inflict constitutional injury. Because of this distinction,
it is indeed questionable to infer from the House rejection of the Sher-
man Amendment that the congressmen would have similarly rejected a
proposal to hold local governments liable for the constitutional torts of
their employees.
Policy considerations, though not articulated in the opinion, may
also have influenced the Court in enunciating the Monell standard of
municipal liability. Many of the lower courts that found a Bivens-type
cause of action against local governments stopped short of imposing
vicarious liability on municipalities.62 These courts, of course, did not
consider the language of section 1983 or the statute's legislative history
when making that decision, but instead relied solely on policy
rationales.
The primary concern expressed by these lower courts was that re-
spondeat superior liability might decimate municipal treasuries, many
of which already are strained almost to the breaking point.63 Others
61. Though the language of§ 1983 does not differentiate between governmental and natural
"persons" in this fashion, support for such a distinction can be found in the statute's legislative
history. In the only portion of the debates that speaks directly to the issue of how courts should
construe the language of § 1983, Representative Shellabarger emphasized that the section is "re-
medial" in nature and that "such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871). Given the remedial inefficacy of§ 1983 for persons injured
by police misconduct, a finding of respondeat superior liability under the statute might be just the
type of liberal construction envisioned by its authors.
62. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1978); Owen v. City of Independence,
560 F.2d 925, 933 n.9 (8th Cir. 1977), vacatedfor reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct. 3118
(1978); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1977); Riley v. City of Minneapolis,
436 F. Supp. 954, 956-57; Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing to find Bivens-type cause of
action because case involved vicarious liability); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975)
(finding Bivens-type cause of action when city ordinance was alleged to be unconstitutional);
Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (suggesting, but not adopting, standard of
municipal liability similar to that in Monell). A few lower federal courts, however, did find re-
spondeat superior liability under a Bivens-type cause of action. See cases cited note 56 supra.
63. E.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1978); Adekalu v. New York City,
431 F. Supp. 812, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Judge Kaufman, writing for the court of appeals in
Turpin, stated: "[Bly permitting liability only in those instances where the municipality is directly
responsible for the unconstitutional behavior, the drain on the local fisc will be minimized. In a
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questioned the need for this liability,' given the practice, now adopted
in several states, of government indemnification of officers who suffer
adverse judgments in section 1983 actions.65 According to these courts,
this practice substantially alleviates the problem of judgment-proof po-
licemen, and guarantees that plaintiffs injured by police misconduct
will be compensated.66 Imposing vicarious liability on municipalities
by judicial fiat also would have entailed a substantial federal reorder-
ing of local affairs, thereby raising serious questions of federalism.
67
Perhaps the Court considered the decision to impose respondeat
superior liability on municipalities one to be made by the states, by
amendment to their respective tort claims acts.
Though the respondeat superior limitation will insulate local gov-
ernments from liability for their officers' ultra vires misconduct, it
should not apply to those cases in which a municipality (or its policy-
making officials) has, for instance, actively encouraged police abuse of
citizens' constitutional rights, or has tolerated such abuse in the face of
a pattern of police misconduct. 68 Governmental action of this kind
would rise to the level of a "policy" or "custom" of advocating police
misconduct, and would then fit squarely within the standard of munici-
pal liability announced in Monell. Lower courts, in delineating the de-
gree of governmental involvement necessary to find liability under a
Bipens-type cause of action, have recognized this distinction and have
circuit whose contours include the City of New York, we are not insensitive to the financial plight
of local governmental bodies." 579 F.2d at 165 (footnote omitted).
64. E.g., Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 392 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
65. For a complete listing of the various indemnification statutes, see Freed, Executive Official
Immunityfor Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526, 564
n.182 (1978).
66. Eg., Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 392 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1977). This claim is debatable.
Many of the statutes apply only if the officer was acting in good faith. Consequently, they do not
provide indemnification for policemen suffering adverse judgments in § 1983 actions who, because
of the qualified immunity, must have been acting maliciously in order to incur § 1983 liability.
Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 137. Also, the system of indemnification has no effect on the
jury's natural bias in favor of the police officer. K. DAVIs, supra note 51, at 595. Thus, many of
the inadequacies of the action against the individual officer remain, despite the availability of
indemnification.
67. Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977). The Court has become increasingly
sensitive to federal reordering of local affairs. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See generally Developments in the
Laiv--Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 4.
68. A paradigmatic case is suggested by a recent report of the Tennessee division of the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission, that found, after an investigation of numerous police brutality claims in
Memphis, Tennessee, that "'police misconduct [in Memphis] is both pervasive and uncon-
trolled.'" NEWSWEEK, September 18, 1978, at 35 (quoting U.S. Civil Rights Commission). The
Memphis Police Department is now being investigated by a subcommittee of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. Id.
1979] MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
indicated that liability would attach when a local government has en-
couraged, or tacitly approved of, police abuse of constitutional rights.6 9
The conclusion that liability can be imposed under section 1983
for mere "tolerance" of police misconduct may be challenged, however,
on the basis of language in Rizzo v. Goode70 in which the Court stated
that some "affirmative link" between the defendant and the constitu-
tional violation was necessary to satisfy the section 1983 causation re-
quirement.71 Rizzo involved an attempt to impose section 1983 liability
on supervisory officials by alleging that they had failed to supervise
their subordinate officers to prevent constitutional violations. The fact
situation faced by the Court in Rizzo is, however, distinguishable from
that posed when a plaintiff proves a pattern of police misconduct,
thereby raising the inference that municipal officials, by acquiescing in
the face of this pattern, had adopted a de facto policy of advocating
police abuse. In Rizzo such a pattern was alleged but not proved, and
the Court emphasized that only a few instances of police misconduct
had been shown actually to have occurred.72 When unconstitutional
police behavior is more prevalent, 73 a different result than that reached
69. E.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 167-68 (2d Cir. 1978); Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 560 F.2d 925, 933 n.9 (8th Cir. 1977), vacatedfor reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct.
3118 (1978); Riley v. City of Minneapolis, 436 F. Supp. 954, 957 (D. Minn. 1977); Adekalu v. New
York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
70. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). This issue is discussed in Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130,
1135-36 (D. Conn. 1978), apparently the first lower court opinion to consider whether a munici-
pality may be held liable for tolerance of police misconduct under the Monell standard. In that
case, the court expressed some doubt whether such an action could be maintained in light of Rizzo.
Id. at 1136. The decision appears, however, to be based on a faulty assumption concerning the
precise holding in Rizzo. At the outset of its discussion, the court wrote: "What the Supreme
Court [in R izzo] found insufficient was the supervisors' 'failure to act in the face of a statistical
pattern' of unconstitutional action by subordinates." Id. at 1135 (citation omitted). In fact, a
"statistical pattern" of police misconduct was not proved in Rizzo-a factor the Court found to be
of some importance. See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
71. 423 U.S. at 371. Rizzo involved a class action brought by a group of Philadelphia citizens
against various municipal officials alleging, among other things, that the officials had failed to take
adequate measures to correct a "pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by
police officers." Id. at 366. The Court denied plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief partly because
the constitutional violations had actually been committed by subordinate officers, not by the
named defendants who, as supervisory officials, played no affirmative role in the unconstitutional
conduct. Id. at 371.
72. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rizzo, noted that though the plaintiffs
had complained of "an 'unacceptably high' number of those incidents [of police misconduct],"
they had proved only a small number, "some 20 in all ... occurring. . . in a city of 3 million
inhabitants, with 7,500 policemen." Id. at 373. Justice Rehnquist considered it significant that
"there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree
from that which exists elsewhere." Id. at 375.
73. As a practical matter, the problems of presenting adequate proof in this situation will be
considerable, unless the plaintiff can produce authoritative documentation of widespread police
misconduct such as that discussed in note 68 supra. See, e.g, Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp.
1130, 1136-37 (D. Conn. 1978) (court discusses procedural requirements for bringing such an ac-
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in Rizzo may be based on recognition of the lack of any substantive
difference between passive tolerance of widespread police misconduct
and affirmative advocacy of such misconduct. In addition, concerns of
federalism played an important role in the Court's decision in Rizzo
because of the interference in the municipality's affairs that would have
resulted from the injunction sought by plaintiffs.74 Similar concerns
would not be raised by awarding damages to persons injured by spe-
cific police abuse. These damage awards would influence municipal
officials to alter their procedures in order to deter police misconduct,
but they could do so on their own terms rather than those of a federal
court judge.
Another issue that should attract the immediate attention of the
lower courts concerns the development of a qualified immunity for mu-
nicipal defendants in section 1983 actions.7 Presumably this would be
similar to immunities granted government officials in section 1983 ac-
tions,76 and would protect a local government from liability for action
taken in good faith and with reasonable grounds to believe that the
action was constitutional.77 The desirability of such an immunity is,
however, questionable. Not only is a qualified immunity for munici-
palities not justified by the rationales used by the Court to support offi-
cial immunity in past decisions, but it also would have the effect of
eviscerating the section 1983 damage remedy for persons injured by
unconstitutional municipal action.
In deciding some of the official immunity cases under section 1983,
the Court has simply adopted the tort immunity accorded the various
officials at common law,7" apparently with the belief that the 1871 Con-
gress did not intend to disturb existing common law doctrines when
enacting section 1983.79 The same approach to the issue of municipal
tion and notes that "[t]he standard for municipal liability predicated on inaction of senior person-
nel must be frankly acknowledged as difficult to meet").
74. 423 U.S. at 378-80.
75. Both the majority and concurring opinions in Monell mentioned the possibility of such a
development. 436 U.S. at 701, 713-14.
76. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state execu-
tives); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police officers). For a survey of the Court's action on
§ 1983 official immunity, see Freed, supra note 65.
77. The Court explained this standard in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
78. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,421 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951).
79. In finding judges absolutely immune under § 1983, the Court wrote: "The legislative rec-
ord gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common law immuni-
ties. . . . We presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish
the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
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immunity is unavailable, however, because under nineteenth century
common law a municipality was absolutely immune for any activity
that could subject it to a section 1983 claim.80 Though common law
doctrines regarding municipal tort liability have recently been abro-
gated in most jurisdictions,8" local governments still retain absolute im-
munity for any tort liability arising from the exercise of "discretionary
functions,"82 which include any policy-making or legislative activity.
Thus, even under contemporary notions of municipal tort liability, a
municipality would be absolutely immune for any activity cognizable
under section 1983. This proves further the futility of looking to tort
doctrines to justify any form of municipal immunity under section
1983.
Policy considerations have also played a major role in the Court's
past official immunity decisions.83 First, the Court has felt that some
form of immunity was needed to ameliorate the unfairness of imposing
personal liability on officials who were merely doing their job in good
faith and without any intention to inflict constitutional injury.8 4 Con-
sequently, the Court has required that officials must have been acting
maliciously or without reasonable grounds to believe in the constitu-
tionality of their actions in order to incur section 1983 liability. Sec-
ond, the Court has feared that the threat of personal liability might
chill an official's proper exercise of discretion" or might even deter citi-
zens from pursuing public service.86
These concerns are significantly alleviated when a municipality is
made the defendant. Indeed, municipal liability provides a refreshing
80. Under common law doctrines prevailing during the nineteenth century, a municipality's
liability in tort depended upon the type of activity that gave rise to the claim. See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 977-87 (4th ed. 1971). If the activity was of a "pro-
prietary" nature - ie. similar to that performed by a private corporation - the local government
enjoyed no immunity. Examples of proprietary activities included the municipal operation of a
public utility, ferry, airport, or garage. Id. at 980-81. But municipalities were absolutely immune
from any liability arising from its involvement in uniquely "governmental" activities, such as
passing laws or implementing governmental policies, id. at 979, the only activities that would give
rise to a § 1983 claim under the Monell standard of municipal liability.
81. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 25.00 to .00-2.
82. Id. § 25.13. The justification for the discretionary function exception is that the judiciary
should not interfere with legislative freedom by levying damage judgments against local govern-
ments when legislative decisions cause personal injury. Id. This separation of powers argument
is, of course, inapplicable to the issue of municipal immunity under § 1983 because the very
purpose of the statute is to ensure federal court supervision over local affairs.
83. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 240 (1974).
84. E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
85. Id.
86. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
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solution to the problems of unfairness and potential deterrence posed
by official liability. Holding a municipality responsible for constitu-
tional violations will remove the harshness of imposing liability on in-
dividual officials and will instead spread the cost of constitutional
injury among all the community's taxpayers as an expense of govern-
ment. Moreover, though some government officials may be inhibited
by the possible impact of their actions on the municipal treasury, the
chilling effect would surely not be as great as that attendant to personal
liability.
87
There may, however, be another policy reason justifying a quali-
fied immunity from municipal defendants in section 1983 actions. Mr.
Justice Powell noted in his concurrence that such an immunity may be
necessary to "remove some of the harshness of liability for good-faith
failure to predict the often uncertain course of constitutional adjudica-
tion."88 Though this is a genuine concern, the Court should be wary of
any rationale supporting a qualified immunity for municipalities. Past
experience with similar immunities for government officials has shown
that, in practice, a qualified immunity often has the effect of an abso-
lute one.89 This is because the qualified immunity protects government
officials unless their actions are contrary to "settled" constitutional
law.90 Because few areas of law are clearly "settled," the official who
violates constitutional rights can almost always hide behind the quali-
fied immunity.9 Should the Court find that municipalities in section
87. Note, supra note 43, at 957. In the first appellate decision to consider the scope of muni-
cipal immunity after Monell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came to an
opposite conclusion. Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, No. 76-1129 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978). The
court held that a school district was entitled to the same qualified immunity from § 1983 liability
as was its school board members because "conscientious board members will be just as concerned
that their decisions or actions might create a liability for damages [against] the board or the local
entity as they are that they would against themselves .... The restriction on the exercise of in-
dependent judgment is the same." Id.; see slip op. at 5. Earlier courts of appeals decisions, which
questioned the applicability of the deterrence argument to the case of a municipal defendant in a
Bivens-type cause of action, suggest that there will be a split of opinion on this issue among the
circuits. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 1977), vacatedfor
reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978) ("primary justification for the defense of
good faith. . . ,to insure that public officials will not hesitate to discharge their duties out of fear
of personal monetary liability .. . .does not exist where the city itself will bear the monetary
award"); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (Ist Cir. 1977) ("[w]hile the imposition of damages
liability on a political subdivision could conceivably result in chilling the performance of some
official functions, the likelihood of substantial inhibition is not great since the officials will not be
held personally liable").
88. 436 U.S. at 713.
89. Freed, supra note 65, at 564.
90. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978).
91. Freed, supra note 65, at 564. The effect of the "settled law" concept can be seen in the
Court's recent decision in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). In that case, plaintiff, a
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1983 actions are protected by a qualified immunity based on the "set-
tled law" concept, the decision in Monell may well be "'drained of
meaning.' "92 Such an immunity would largely emasculate the section
1983 damage remedy, making it extremely difficult for citizens to be
compensated for constitutional injury inflicted by local governments.
The remedial purpose of section 1983 demands that at most only mini-
mal immunity93 be accorded municipal defendants in section 1983
actions.
In Monell, the Court finally responded to years of judicial and
scholarly criticism of the municipal immunity doctrine by overruling
Monroe v. Pape and holding that local governments may be subject to
liability under section 1983. The decision can best be seen as a com-
promise between two extremes-the total municipal immunity of
Monroe on the one hand, and full municipal liability, including respon-
deal superior liability, on the other. The Court settled for a standard of
municipal liability midway between those two, similar to standards
adopted by a number of lower federal courts in Bivens-type causes of
action. The issue not resolved in Monell is the scope of the qualified
immunity for municipal defendants in section 1983 actions. The lower
courts first considering this issue should recognize that such an immu-
nity could have an extremely damaging effect on the remedial function
of section 1983, and, accordingly, should restrict the scope of the
immunity.
THOMAS L. ALLEN
state prisoner, alleged that prison officials had violated his first amendment rights by interfering
with his outgoing mail. The Court held that the officials were immune under § 1983 because
"there was no 'clearly established' First and Fourteenth Amendment right with respect to the
correspondence of convicted prisoners in 1971-1972 [when the violations occurred]." Id. at 565.
92. 436 U.S. at 701 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974)). Defendants in
Monell, for example, would be completely absolved of liability under § 1983 because the Court's
decision in La/leur was handed down three years after the alleged constitutional violations
occurred.
93. One author has suggested that municipal immunity be limited to those situations in
which potential liability looms so great that it poses a threat to the continued operation of the
municipality. Note, supra note 43, at 958. As an example, the author posits a case in which blacks
bring an action against al illegally segregated school system, seeking damages for reduced earning
capacity totaling millions of dollars. Id.
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